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PRESERVING COMPETITION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
LEGAL STANDARDS AND MICROSOFT
Ronald A. Cass*
Keith N. Hylton**

INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law is a hammer, not a scalpel. It is a blunt instrument that can
have a powerful impact but only against something very much like a
nail—it cannot be used effectively against small imperfections, to nip and
tuck so that the economy can be shaped just so.
That lesson is evident to all who have been on the receiving end of
antitrust enforcement and to all who seriously contemplate that prospect.1
It is not, however, evident to many who write about this field.
A recent article by Professor Steven Salop and Craig Romaine illustrates
both the attractions of and the problems associated with the nip-and-tuck
school of antitrust analysis.2 Professor Salop and Dr. Romaine use the
Microsoft litigation as their focus for discussion of antitrust law, or
perhaps their piece stands the other way around.3 Their article reports the
allegations of behavior by Microsoft that plaintiffs in litigation with
*
Dean and Melville Madison Bigelow Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law; senior fellow, International Centre for Economic Research.
**
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial and administrative support provided by
Boston University, the International Centre for Economic Research, and Microsoft
Corporation. We also thank Hilary Holbrook, Pete Rinato, and Russell Sweet for research
assistance, and David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols, and Bernard Reddy for helpful comments.
1
See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. MCGOWAN & JOEN A. GREENWOOD, FOLDED,
SPINDLED AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM (MIT Press 1983)
(describing the government’s economic analysis in the IBM litigation and the costs imposed
by such litigation).
2
Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis,
Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999).
3
The authors of this paper are consultants to Microsoft, while Professor Salop and Dr.
Romaine are consultants to clients involved in possible antitrust litigation against Microsoft.
It would be a mistake, however, to view the debate between us and Salop-Romaine as
simply the product of different client interests. It is more accurate to say that the different
affiliations we have reflect differences in perspective on antitrust and competition issues that
are thrown into sharp relief in arguments over the Microsoft litigation. Nothing in this reply
should be construed as an assertion that positions taken in the Salop-Romaine paper are
litigation-driven rather than principled.
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Microsoft assert constitute violations of the antitrust law.4 Salop and
Romaine argue that each allegation could constitute evidence of a design
by Microsoft to reduce competition and preserve or extend a monopoly
they assume Microsoft possesses.5 They argue as well that the right legal
standard to apply is one that draws conclusions about corporate purpose
largely from the effects specific behavior has or could have and consciously frames this standard so that the benefit of the doubt goes to
plaintiffs.6 Tilting the standard against defendants such as Microsoft is
justified, according to Salop and Romaine, by the need to protect markets
against the vices Microsoft’s alleged acts might generate.7
We believe that the Salop-Romaine arguments are misguided. Though
purporting to offer a middle ground, they would dramatically expand the
reach of antitrust law and would provide enormous discretion to decision
makers who, following their arguments, could characterize an extraordinary
array of ordinary business activity as violating antitrust strictures. The
standard suggested by Salop and Romaine is the wrong standard under
current law and is at odds with better economic analysis. This article
exposes problems with their approach, explains why it departs from current
antitrust standards, and urges an approach consistent with current standards
that respects the hammer-like quality of antitrust law.
I. THE ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK
Three Lessons from the Law
The basic charter of U.S. antitrust law is the Sherman Act of 1890.8 While
not a model of clarity in all respects (a point we return to momentarily),
the act makes three things plain.
The first is that its provisions are intended to reach extreme, not
ordinary, conduct—which is why conduct that violates the act’s major
provisions constitute felonies.9 The provision primarily addressed by Salop
and Romaine, § 2, says:

4

Salop & Romaine, at 619-24, 626-27, 629-30, 632-40, 642.
Salop & Romaine, at 619-20, 622-42.
6
Salop & Romaine, at 655-65.
7
Salop & Romaine, at 661-65, 670-71
8
26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (as amended).
9
Originally, the Act specified that violations of its provisions were misdemeanors,
though it specifically authorized prison sentences as punishment The length of potential
prison terms was later extended, resulting in the classification of violations as felonies. See
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209; Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282.
5
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Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to

monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . .10
Similarly, the other principal provision of the Sherman Act, § 1, declares:
Every person who shall make any contract or en-

gage in any combination or conspiracy [in restraint
of trade] shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . .11
Felonies are serious crimes, and these provisions expressly authorize
substantial prison terms as well as hefty fines.12 These are not akin to
traffic regulations, attaching to minor infractions for business conduct that
strays a bit from the path of acceptable, competitive activity. Rather, these
provisions target conduct that was thought fundamentally to threaten the
competitive structure of our economy.13
The second obvious aspect of the Sherman Act is its entirely negative
character. The law does not say that US attorneys or the Attorney General
must assure that every market is perfectly competitive or even that every
market is competitive in any measure. It does not guarantee competitors
equal shares of markets or equal access to credit or to store space or to
10

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
12
Initially, the law provided for one year in prison and a fine of $5,000, later increased
to three years in prison and fines of $50,000, then $100,000 for individuals (now $350,000)
and $1 million for corporations (now $10 million). See Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1,
26 Stat. 209 ($5,000 fine, 1 year imprisonment); Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282
($50,000 fine, 3 years imprisonment); Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat.
1708 ($100,000 individual, $1 million corporate fine); Act of Nov. 16, 1990, Pub. L. 101588, § 4(a), 104 Stat. 2880 (amending Sherman Act § 1 to increase fines from one million
to $10 million against corporations, and from $100,000 to $350,000 against individuals.)
See S. Rep. No. 101-287, at 1-2 (1990) (summarizing changes). The initial $5,000 fine in
1890 would be roughly equivalent to $100,000 today, adjusting simply for changes in the
consumer price index. If the fine were adjusted in order to remain the same size in relation
to GNP, it would be roughly $3.2 million today.
13
See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940);
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); Increasing Criminal
Penalties Under the Sherman Antitrust Act: Report of House Comm. on Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. Rep. No. 84-70, at 5 (1955); Protection of Trade and Commerce
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies: Report of House Comm. on Judiciary, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. Rep. No. 51-1707 (1890) (seeking to protect against “evils and
oppression of trusts and monopolies” within the limits of federal power).
11
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customers or anything else. Competitors are not granted any positive
rights. As a byproduct of the law’s prohibitions, however, consumers and
producers alike share the benefits of markets that are free from the effects
of practices utterly inimical to a competitive environment.14
Third, a great deal turns on interpretation of the antitrust law. Its spare
language does not proscribe specific conduct but instead targets a few
generically described behaviors that undermine the operation of ordinary,
competitive markets. But just what those generic behaviors do and do not
include—what specific activity will get a business hammered—is not
obvious on the face of the statute. Why, for example, does § 2 punish
someone who “monopolizes” a market, but not someone who has a
monopoly? Does that provide a clue to the section’s meaning? It has
been up to courts (aided to greater or lesser degrees by administrative
agencies and commentators) to put flesh on the antitrust law’s bones, to
determine which conduct falls within one of the law’s prohibitions and
which does not.15
Interpretation and Economics
Increasingly, judges have turned to economic analysis to separate ordinary
business activity—the activity of market competition—from conduct
inimical to the operation of competitive markets.16 Economic analysis,
however, does not always provide a single, accepted answer to the judges’
questions.
Broadly speaking, two schools of economic analysis have emerged. One
explains why conduct that courts might have seen as threatening ordinary
market operation either does not do so or is so far from a rational business
strategy as to be an improbable occurrence.17 The approach of this school
14

For explication of this point in a series of antitrust contexts, see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (Basic Books 1978); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Univ. of Chicago Press 1976).
15
See, e.g., Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988);
POSNER, supra note 14, at 3; William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers: Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1982).
16
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (1991); Andrew M. Rosenfield, The Use of Economics in Antitrust
Litigation and Counseling, 1986 COLUM BUS. L. REV. 49.
17
See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981);
Benjamin Klein & Kevin Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms,
28 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON.
289, 296-300 (1980). For overviews of this approach, see William H. Page, The Chicago

[DRAFT]

ECONOMICS, LEGAL STANDARDS & MICROSOFT

5

(often referred to as the Chicago School) is akin to the rationalist’s
reaction to reports of flying saucers—if that is what you think you saw,
think again before spending too much time and effort deciding what to do
with the little green men.
The other school of economic analysis follows a different path, postulating reasons why seemingly innocent—or at least ordinary—business
activity actually could be designed to subvert competitors and, perhaps,
competition.18 Writings in this genre deploy sophisticated arguments to
establish that conduct that looks ambiguous or even benign should be
treated as contrary to the antitrust law’s constraints. These writings
frequently rely on subtle distinctions to separate the conduct they would
stigmatize as anti-competitive from the conduct they find pro-competitive
and advocate antitrust remedies that assertedly do, if not perfect justice, its
next of kin. These writings also typically rely on complex mathematical
or game-theoretic models to demonstrate that important aspects of ordinary
market competition can break down under certain assumptions (assumptions that are difficult, if not impossible, to verify from observable data).19
We refer to writings in this vein as belonging to the “nip-and-tuck” school
of antitrust analysis. Professor Salop is one of the leading representatives
of this school, and his article on “raising rivals’ costs” was one of the first
missiles launched in the Chicago counter-revolution.20
We use the Salop-Romaine article as our foil not because we have any
special quarrel with these authors, but because their work illustrates
effectively the problems that nip-and-tuck analysis, even in the hands of its
ablest craftsmen, will generate. Its focus on the Microsoft case throws in

School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary
Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979).
18
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility:
Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940 (1986);
Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69
AM. ECON. REV. 335 (1979). See also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics:
Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement in a Less Determinate Theoretical World,
63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1995).
19
See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20
RAND J. ECON. 113, 117-19 (1989) (critiquing nip-and-tuck analysis as poor examples of
“exemplifying theory”—theory that “does not tell us what must happen [but instead] what
can happen.”).
20
See Steven C. Salop & David Sheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
267 (1983).
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sharp relief what is at stake in the analytical game economists presently
are about.
II. FINDING ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT
Microsoft: Looking for Mr. Badbar
Salop and Romaine run through a litany of allegations respecting Microsoft, touching on assertions examined in past investigations and those
advanced in current litigation. They acknowledge that many of these
allegations are contested, but they treat the allegations as facts for their
discussion of possible anti-competitive effects of business conduct. It is
worth briefly reviewing the principal allegations.
Over the past decade, complaints by Microsoft competitors have focused
attention on Microsoft’s contracting practices, product development,
product distribution, and marketing—in other words, on practically every
aspect of Microsoft’s operation. In the early 1990s, the Federal Trade
Commission considered assertions that Microsoft had violated the antitrust
laws in agreeing to develop operating systems in cooperation with IBM.21
The FTC investigation quickly turned from that assertion to other allegations. The FTC investigated numerous charges against Microsoft over
three years but declined to pursue these matters further.22 The Department
of Justice then instituted its own investigation.
Four of the issues subject to investigation by the FTC or DOJ deserve
note. First, the agencies considered complaints that Microsoft allowed
computer makers (commonly referred to as Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMs) to license software on a “per processor” basis. These
licenses gave an OEM a small discount if it agreed to pay Microsoft
royalties on all computers shipped with the particular microprocessors
designated by an OEM in a license agreement. This provision essentially

21

Professor William Page has concluded that the investigation’s initiation was
independent of complaints by Microsoft competitors but that the competitors’ played an
active role in pressing for examination of certain issues. Indeed, he opines that “[T]he
magnitude and frequency of the contacts between Microsoft’s rivals and the enforcement
agencies raise the question whether some form of regularity should be imposed on the
lobbying process in major cases.” William H. Page, Microsoft and the Public Choice
Critique of Antitrust, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 11 (1999).
22
Both the Commissioners and the staff split on the question of whether there was any
matter worthy of further action. The Commission declined to move forward on a 2-2 vote
with the remaining Commission member not participating. The two bureaus that had looked
into these matters advanced conflicting recommendations, one suggesting further inquiry, one
opposing it.
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relieved Microsoft of the need to monitor actual shipments of its software,
allowing it instead to track only reported shipments of, for example,
computers using Intel’s “386” microprocessor. A second focus of investigation addressed Microsoft’s treatment of those OEMs who were licensed
to use Microsoft software on a given number of machines and agreed to
ship at least a certain number but over the license period shipped fewer
machines. Microsoft did not automatically permit such licensees to use
their “prepaid balances” from one license agreement to offset amounts due
under successor license agreements.23 Third, firms complained that Microsoft made announcements of forthcoming products far in advance of their
release in order to stifle sale of competitors’ earlier-released products (an
allegation that Microsoft produced “vaporware” when it was not producing
software). Fourth, the investigators looked at complaints that Microsoft
did not share sufficiently soon with other software producers information
respecting the application programming interfaces (APIs) in its operating
system. The APIs allow other software to use parts of the operating
system to access files or to utilize links to hardware such as printers. The
agencies considered the assertion that antitrust laws required Microsoft to
make information respecting its APIs—which are part of the copyrighted
software in any operating system—available during their development.
Although nearly all of the issues in the FTC-DOJ investigation are
mentioned by Salop and Romaine,24 DOJ and Microsoft settled the matter
with a consent decree focusing almost entirely on the first set of these
allegations, on terms for OEM contracts.25 And despite Salop and Romaine’s casual assertion that the contract terms at issue “raised the costs
of rival operating system entrants . . . and created strong incentives for
OEMs to deal exclusively with Microsoft,”26 DOJ’s own expert at the

23

Some FTC staff thought that Microsoft should grant offsets against payments due
under successor contracts while others thought that Microsoft should simply rebate payments
whenever an OEM did not ship the amount contracted for. Other Commission staff thought
that there was nothing problematic about Microsoft’s treatment of OEM payments, just as
staff divided on other issues in the FTC investigation. See note 22 supra. This issue did
not arise for OEMs whose shipments exceeded their committed volumes; they simply owed
Microsoft the agreed-upon royalty rate for their extra shipments.
24
See Salop & Romaine, at 622 n.14 (contracting), 626, 634 n.49 (APIs), 637 n.57
(vaporware).
25
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,096 (D.D.C.
1995). In addition to regulating use of license provisions such as the per-processor license,
the decree regulated the length of license contracts and nondisclosure terms in certain
agreements with other software developers.
26
Salop & Romaine, at 622 n.14.
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time, Kenneth Arrow, thought the practices had relatively little impact on
Microsoft’s fortunes:
[Microsoft’s OEM] licensing practices . . . made only a
minor contribution to the growth of Microsoft’s installed
base. Even this minor contribution overstates the impact
of Microsoft’s licensing practices on its installed base
barrier to the entry and growth of competing operating
systems.27

Professor Arrow’s assumption that there is a barrier to entry—implicitly
accepting the DOJ characterization of a narrow market for operating systems28—is disputed, but, even accepting that, he found the accused licensing practices of little moment. In his judgment, the success of Microsoft’s
operating system was driven by factors that were not significantly affected
by the challenged licensing practices or even by the ability of competing
operating systems to gain access to particular channels of distribution.29
Litigation against Microsoft by others has picked up some of the
assertions not pursued in the earlier case, and plaintiffs (including DOJ)
have added new allegations as well. Two sets of allegations are especially

27

Declaration
of
Kenneth
J.
Arrow
at
5,
available
at
<http:web.lawcrawler.com/microsoft/usdoj/cases/0049.htm>[hereinafter Arrow Declaration].
The portion of the quote elided in the text above states Arrow’s view that the contested
practices were a “significant impediment to the use of the OEM distribution channel by
competing operating system suppliers.” In Professor Arrow’s view, the practices, hence,
were “anticompetitive” even though they did not alter the demand for Microsoft’s operating
system.
28
In the agency investigations, the 1994 DOJ complaint, and the current DOJ litigation,
the government has defined a narrower market than the text suggests, limited to operating
systems for computers with Intel or Intel-compatible microprocessors. See <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm> (1994 Complaint at ¶ 13, 1998 Complaint at ¶ 54).
29
Professor Arrow agreed with the DOJ’s characterization of the contested practices
as “anticompetitive” and also agreed that the practices impeded use of the OEM distribution
channel by competing operating systems’ suppliers but did not support DOJ’s assertions
respecting the degree to which those practices noted above affected demand for Microsoft
operating systems. See Arrow Declaration, supra note 27. Professor Arrow observed,
however, that the consent decree was forward-looking: “The complaint and proposed Final
Judgment address the effects of Microsoft’s licensing practices on future sales of competing
operating systems.” The end of the challenged licensing practices five years ago, however,
has not led to a surge in popularity of “competing operating systems” on Intel-compatible
computers. The continued success of Windows following the elimination of the disputed
contract terms provides at least prima facie support for Arrow’s conclusion that the
contracting practices did not account for the demand for Microsoft’s products.
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important to Salop and Romaine’s argument.30 One is that Microsoft gave
its Web browser away at a zero price and integrated its browser into its
operating system to undercut Netscape’s competing Web browser.31 The
other is that Microsoft insisted on contract terms with OEMs, with Independent Software Vendors (ISVs), and with Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) that effectively excluded Netscape from access to consumers or that
handicapped it in its competition with Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.
Salop and Romaine state that Microsoft had a “policy of reducing the
price of its browser or giving it away to some customers by bundling it
with Windows.”32 The intimation of a change in pricing over time is
wrong, but the assertion that Microsoft’s Web browser has been available
at low cost or no cost is correct. From the outset, Microsoft included its

30
Salop and Romaine also spend some time on a third set of allegations involving
Microsoft’s version of the “Java Virtual Machine” (JVM). See Salop & Romaine, at 63233. Similar allegations have given rise to litigation between Microsoft and Sun Microsystems. Sun is the principal pioneer and promoter of the Java programming language which,
in some versions, assertedly allows programs to be written so that they can run on any
computer that contains JVM software. The allegations in issue in the Sun-Microsoft
litigation are fairly complex and not essential to understanding our criticism of Salop and
Romaine’s arguments. The important claims in the litigation, referenced by Salop and
Romaine, concern Microsoft’s implementation of its license agreement with Sun in two
respects. The first involves Microsoft’s decision to allow a Java program to gain access to
specific Windows features if a program is written to take advantage of this aspect of
Microsoft’s JVM. The second addresses Microsoft’s decision not to design its JVM to
enable a different method for allowing a Java program to access capabilities located outside
the JVM (a method Sun claims is required by the license agreement and Microsoft asserts
is not). Apart from the interpretation of contract language, the Sun-Microsoft controversy
is over a choice between two different methods for allowing Java programs to gain access
to a program external to the JVM. The choice is not between a restricted technology and
a cross-platform technology. Salop & Romaine note that the Microsoft JVM does not
degrade operation of Java programs. They treat the creation of Microsoft’s Windowsoriented version of the JVM as potentially anti-competitive, however, even though that
appears to provide an additional alternative for software programs. At present, programmers
can choose to use the Windows-specific features in Microsoft’s JVM, can write a Java
program that takes advantage of features associated with certain other JVMs, or can write
a Java program that should be able to run on Sun’s or IBM’s or Netscape’s JVM as well
as on Microsoft’s JVM. (This is possible, for example, using the JVM being produced by
Transvirtual Technologies, which implements both Sun’s and Microsoft’s enhancements to
Java and should run programs designed for either approach. See <http://www.transvirtual.com>.) In this context, it is hard to see the Sun-Microsoft contest over Java license terms
as central to the arguments Salop and Romaine advance. That, along with the complexity
of the factual disputes, informs our decision not to treat this subject further here.
31
Salop and Romaine assert that Microsoft provided benefits that made the price of
its Internet Explorer “negative” in some instances. Salop & Romaine, at 639.
32
Salop & Romaine, at 636.
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Internet Explorer browser at no separate charge with OEM versions of
Windows 95 and also made it generally available for free to users who
could download it from Microsoft's Web site.33 The program’s third
generation and later versions were more tightly integrated parts of the
operating system, making various functions—such as the ability to parse
Web addresses, to decipher and display Web pages—available to other
software vendors through documented APIs. Installation of newer versions
of Internet Explorer upgrades the relevant operating system files (deleting
and replacing code) and provides an icon that makes the Internet Explorer
features available directly to the end-user. Thus, unlike what most of us
think of as “stand-alone” programs, Internet Explorer, whether acquired
together with the operating system or subsequently, becomes part of the
operating system when installed. In that sense, it is always, as Salop and
Romaine say, “bundled” with Windows.34
The second set of allegations, respecting Microsoft contracts with
various entities, stands on less firm footing. Salop and Romaine report
that “Microsoft allegedly made exclusive deals requiring certain ISPs (e.g.,
AOL) and OEMs (e.g., Compaq, Apple) to carry Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer browser instead of Netscape’s browser.”35 The contracts that
Salop and Romaine reference separate into two groups. Neither group
involves what looks like a Microsoft requirement that the other contract
party deal exclusively with Microsoft.
One group, primarily contracts with OEMs, are non-exclusive licensing
arrangements.36 These contracts require that licensees agree to provide

33

Microsoft’s initial release of Windows 95 as an upgrade for consumers did not
include Internet Explorer, though subsequent releases did. And downloads from Microsoft’s
Web site were available prior to the upgrade release in an integrated version.
34
Microsoft’s view, however, is that the concept of “bundling” is inapposite, as all of
the various versions of Internet Explorer were improvements to the Windows operating
system, not unrelated programs. Hence, rather than combining two different products,
Microsoft was adding new or improved features to its operating system to make the system
more attractive to potential customers. The different conceptions of the software—and
concomitant differences in terminology—often make the discussions of a single event by
Microsoft supporters and opponents difficult to follow. Even where we find Microsoft’s
view compelling, we will try to describe events in ways that will be comprehensible to those
who approach matters from a different vantage.
35
Salop & Romaine, at 636.
36
See Ronald A. Cass, Copyright, Licensing, and the “First Screen”, 5 U. MICH. J.
TELECOMM. & TECH. (Issue No. 2, 1999). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil
Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v.
Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D. D.C.), direct testimony of Richard L.
Schmalensee, Jan. 3, 1999, at ¶ 357 [hereinafter, Schmalensee Direct].
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consumers a copyrighted program in its entirety, without removing any
portion of it, but they do not limit OEMs’ ability to carry other products
that the user could substitute for any portion of the operating system, to
place icons for other products in as favorable a position as icons for
aspects of the Microsoft product, to provide prompts or other devices that
make it easy to use the non-Microsoft program as a default, or to take a
number of other steps that would facilitate competition from other programs.37
The other group—principally the contract with AOL—comes closer to
fitting Salop and Romaine’s description.
But these contracts do not
provide for exclusivity in the sense of Salop and Romaine’s argument nor
do they support the conclusion that whatever level of “exclusivity” they
granted was imposed at Microsoft’s behest to give Microsoft an advantage
over a competitor. AOL, for instance, provides subscribers its proprietary
software that allows users to perform several functions, including gaining
access to the Internet.38 (AOL distributes this software for free—in large
measure to potential subscribers in hopes of inducing them to join AOL.)
Initially, the software included AOL’s own Web browser, but improvements in other browsers prompted AOL to discuss with both Netscape and
Microsoft the prospect of using one or the other in preference to AOL’s
Web browser in its proprietary software. Whichever firm won that
competition would have an “exclusive” contract with AOL.39
The question in this instance is not so much what the contract between
AOL and Microsoft provides as what should be made of it. Microsoft
argues that a winner-take-all competition in which one party wins necessarily results in exclusion of the losing competitor for the contract period, but
it should not be anti-competitive for one competitor to participate in the
37

See Cass, supra note 36.
Although subscribers can rely strictly on AOL’s software to access AOL features
through the dial-in network or to access and browse the Internet, the AOL software allows
flexibility both in access to and use of the Internet. The current version of AOL’s software
allows subscribers with other Internet connections to access AOL without using the AOL
dial-in network. In addition, subscribers who access the Internet through AOL can use
browsers other than that provided with the AOL software and can even use AOL keywords
to download copies of Netscape’s browser.
39
The Government argues that AOL decided to contract with Microsoft because
Microsoft offered AOL “preferential treatment” in its visibility on the Windows desktop.
Microsoft did offer to distribute AOL’s software with Windows and to make the software
accessible to the user through a folder on the Windows desktop. Evidence in the record,
however, suggests that the basis for the choice of Microsoft over Netscape principally was
the former’s provision of a “componentized” browser that allowed greater flexibility to AOL.
See Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 285, 405-07, 412.
38
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contest.40 If it would be consistent with competitive interests—either from
a normative economic perspective or from the vantage of the antitrust
laws—for AOL to award the contract to Netscape or to decide that neither
Netscape nor Microsoft offered sufficient advantages to change from its
own browser, why should it be inconsistent with those interests for AOL
to choose Microsoft?
Salop and Romaine have a rather more skeptical view of all of these
activities, alleged and actual. That is where we disagree most strongly
with Salop and Romaine’s approach.
Thermos Problems in Antitrust Analysis
Salop and Romaine’s discussion of Microsoft is instructive in part because
it illustrates the critical role of interpretive attitude in performing the
analysis they suggest. The old canard about the thermos is that it must
possess a marvelous intelligence; it keeps hot things hot and cold things
cold—but how does it know which to do? The same problem of characterization makes Salop and Romaine’s approach dependent on thermos-like
intelligence. Consider three allegations of anti-competitive conduct by
Microsoft.
One is that Microsoft entered into contracts with OEMs that did not all
expire at the same time. Salop and Romaine explain:
[C]ontracts that do not all expire at the same time . . .
increase[] the coordination problem and entry costs
facing the new entrant. If all the contracts expired at
the same time, the entrant might be able to coordinate its
entry and the start dates of its own contracts.41

For Salop and Romaine, a commitment to use Microsoft’s product
necessarily excludes competing products from access to those customers.
This means that other products can compete effectively only when such

40
Id. at ¶ 203. See also Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON.
55 (1968) (under appropriate conditions—specifically, all production inputs available to
bidders at prices determined in the market and no collusion among bidders—competitive
bidding in natural monopoly setting results in competitive prices); Richard A. Posner, The
Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 98, 115
(1972) (critiquing overregulation of bidding for cable franchises; “As long as there [is] more
than on bidder and collusion among bidders [is] prevented – conditions that ought not to
be insuperably difficult to secure – the process of bidding subscriber rates down and quality
of service up would eliminate monopoly pricing and profits.”)
41
Salop & Romaine, at 638 n.58.
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contracts expire. Viewed from the perspective of concern over any action
that raises rivals’ costs, the increase in coordination problems for competitors to Microsoft suffices to sustain a conclusion that use of contracts
without uniform termination dates is anti-competitive.
Yet, imagine that Microsoft had insisted that all OEMs or ISPs or others
who contracted to use Microsoft’s copyrighted product must agree to
contracts that ended on a given date. Is there any doubt that writers of
the Salop-Romaine perspective would declare the coordinated contracts to
be especially inimical to competition? After all, during the period of the
group contracts a prospective entrant would be excluded from access to the
business of all of the contract parties. And because terms of all contracts
would be concurrent, it would be difficult for a new entrant to break into
the market—the newcomer could not sign up a few customers as a signal
to others that they should consider switching when their contracts with
Microsoft expired, so he would have to persuade a larger group to switch
at once.42
The Salop-Romaine approach would support arguments that staggered
contract terms are bad and that coordinated contract terms are bad. Its
protean quality makes every business action potentially a basis for liability.
Some judgment must be made to screen the actions that will be deemed
anti-competitive from those that will not. It appears that in Salop and
Romaine’s world, whether the action is or is not in fact the basis for
liability will depend in the first instance on whether the decision-maker
believes the defendant wrongly is keeping potential entrants out of a
market in which the defendant has too much power or believes instead that
the defendant is rightly competing aggressively against rival firms.43
Economic analysis should help resolve those issues. Its purported
benefit is its capacity to replace subjective judgments about such matters
with relatively determinate answers. The contribution of economic analysis should not be dependent on a decision-maker’s predisposition respecting the issues that are its critical inputs. Yet that is precisely where Salop

42
For similar arguments, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 22330 (1986); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive
Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 71 (1987).
43
Salop and Romaine would not make this the sole determinant of liability, as a firm
engaged in conduct with anti-competitive effects could avoid liability under their test if its
conduct were shown to generate greater benefits for consumers than harm. Salop &
Romaine, at 659-65. We address their proposed legal standard later in this article, but we
object at the outset to casting the net of possible anti-competitive effects as broadly as the
Salop-Romaine approach.
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and Romaine’s economic analysis would leave us. It opens the specter of
a world in which a defendant could be found to be engaged in anticompetitive conduct by one court for insisting on contracts with a uniform
termination date, then by another court for switching to contracts with
staggered expiration dates, with both courts relying on the same analytical
methodology.
The result suggested above is not peculiar to that example. The same
problem surfaces in considering how Salop and Romaine would treat the
“prepaid balances” issue.
Recall that the FTC-DOJ investigation considered complaints about
Microsoft’s failure to credit a licensee with payments made in contemplation of shipments the licensee committed to but did not make. Assertedly,
Microsoft’s failure routinely to credit OEMs for such payments, directly or
in successor license agreements, was anti-competitive.44 It seems likely
that Salop and Romaine would concur. The refusal to rebate funds for
software not shipped would give OEMs an incentive to ship all the
Microsoft software they could under the license agreement, up to the full
quantity covered by the agreement. A competing software firm presumably would be disadvantaged by this term. Payment to Microsoft for the
full quantity covered by the license would be a sunk cost, so the marginal
cost of shipping a Microsoft program already contracted for would be
zero.45 Other software, then, either would have to be offered at a similar
price—which in all likelihood will not be remunerative for the other
firm—or would have to enjoy such a marked advantage over Microsoft’s
product as to be worth the added cost. Salop and Romaine deploy essentially the same argument in discussing the competition between Microsoft
and Netscape, addressed further below.46
The conclusion that refusing to rebate “prepaid balances” is anti-competitive, however, does not plainly exclude the prospect of finding that
granting such rebates is also anti-competitive. After all, if prepaid balances were subject to rebate in future license agreements with Microsoft,
that could be an inducement for OEMs to enter successor agreements with
Microsoft rather than with competitors.47 If, as Salop and Romaine urge,
it is anti-competitive to have license agreements that expire at different

44

See discussion in text and note supra at note 23.
Of course, this is true only looking at the matter ex post, after the contract is signed.
It does not reflect the OEMs’ calculation when considering the contract ex ante.
46
Salop & Romaine, at 627-29, 638-39.
47
This concern apparently influenced some FTC staff participating in the investigation
of Microsoft. See notes 23 & 22 supra.
45
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times (which has only the mildest possible effect on licensee incentives to
continue using Microsoft’s product), a rebate policy would seem clearly to
fall within Salop and Romaine’s definition of anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, that exact argument is being advanced at present in litigation against
Microsoft.48 Ironically, the plaintiff making that claim is the successor
firm to a Microsoft competitor that urged the FTC and DOJ to find
Microsoft’s actual contracting practice unlawful.49
If both refusing to grant rebates and granting them could be anticompetitive, how will the Salop-Romaine analysis sort things out? As
with the timing of contract expiration, Salop and Romaine’s approach
provides ample ammunition for arguing that particular business practices
are anti-competitive, but it does not provide a ready way to distinguish
ordinary competitive practices from anti-competitive practices.
This point is seen again in another of Salop and Romaine’s arguments.
They report allegations that Microsoft misbehaved by offering ISPs and
OEMs “favors, such as . . . low or zero prices” for its Web browser in
exchange for ISPs’ and OEMs’ agreement to “favor Internet Explorer over
Netscape.”50 They also recite the complaint that Microsoft gave “its
browser to consumers for free.”51 Salop and Romaine suggest that these
activities are part of a predatory strategy by Microsoft against Netscape
and other potential competitors.52
Again, however, the Salop-Romaine analysis can be turned in the
opposite direction. Discussing markets with network externalities, Salop
and Romaine state that entrants must, in order to compete effectively,
engage in costly activities that attract consumers and others who might be
helpful in garnering consumers. Such activities include “selling . . .
initially at a very low price or giving [the product] away to gain market
share.”53 In other words, selling at a very low or zero price is either a
predatory strategy or a competitive necessity.54
48
See Complaint, Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 181 F.R.D. 506 (D. Utah 1998)
(No. 96-CV-645-B).
49
Caldera purchased Novell’s DR-DOS assets in July 1996. Its litigation against
Microsoft was filed on the day its purchase was completed. See Caldera, Inc., “Software
Developer Caldera Sues Microsoft for Antitrust Practices,” Press Release, Jul. 24, 1996,
available at <http://www.calderathin.com/aboutcaldera/publicrelations/html/1996/dosuit.html>.
50
Salop & Romaine, at 623.
51
Salop & Romaine, at 623.
52
Salop & Romaine, at 624-45.
53
Salop & Romaine, at 621-22.
54
See MICHAEL CUSUMANO & DAVID YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNET TIME 99 (Free
Press 1998); Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 248, 270-82.
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Salop and Romaine indicate that low-price browser distribution was an
essential competitive strategy for Netscape but was an anti-competitive
effort to extend or preserve a monopoly for Microsoft.55 Neither
conclusion is clearly correct. When Microsoft began distributing Internet
Explorer at low or zero prices, Netscape was the dominant provider of
Web browsers, a product for which there are apparent network
externalities. Indeed, Netscape enjoyed a share of browser use estimated
to have been as high as 70 to 80 percent in 1996 and certainly above half,
however measured.56 Although Microsoft had determined that it would
add Web browser functionality to its operating system before Netscape
began marketing its Web browser, Netscape was the clear leader in this
arena when Microsoft’s Web browser became available to consumers with
the release of Windows 95.57
Why, then, is Microsoft cast as the firm that sold at low or zero cost to
preserve monopoly (which it is asserted to have in what Salop and
Romaine treat as a different product market from browsers)58 and Netscape
as the firm competing to break into a market? Why is the characterization
not the other way around?
One answer might be that Microsoft’s share of browser use (or of
browser users or other measure of relative success) increased during the
period considered by Salop and Romaine.59 That, of course, is the likely

55

We believe this is an accurate characterization of Salop and Romaine’s argument.
Salop and Romaine do not, however, analyze Microsoft’s position carefully. They do not
find that PC operating systems is the relevant antitrust market; they assume that it is, just
as they assume that Microsoft has monopoly power, declaring that it “is not implausible that
Microsoft has monopoly power in a market for operating systems.” Salop & Romaine, at
620.
56
Estimates of past browser share vary, but all estimates give Netscape the lead for a
considerable time, certainly including all of 1995-97. If the current AOL browser (which
is based on Internet Explorer) is included with Internet Explorer use, then Internet Explorer
became the leading browser in 1998. If the AOL browser is classified as a separate
browser, Netscape still would be the leading browser through 1998 and into 1999, with a
share of overall use currently estimated at approximately 40 percent. Estimates of a browser
share as high as 80 percent for Netscape in 1996, however, appear exaggerated, basing the
figure on data that fail to count many users who accessed the Internet using a browser
provided by AOL or other on-line services. See Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at
Appendix D, ¶¶ 3, 44, 47-52.
57
See Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 207-14.
58
Although Salop and Romaine treat browsers as a separate market from operating
systems, they expressly abjure reliance on that, stating that “whether the browser is treated
as part of the operating system or as a separate market is not crucial to our analysis.” Salop
& Romaine, at 620.
59
See Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 289-90.
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outcome when one introduces a new product. Whatever the nature of the
competition, the odds are that the new product—which starts without any
share of the market—will gain market share and that competing products
already on the market will lose market share. There simply is nothing
inherently suspect about an increase in market share.60
Perhaps that first answer is slightly off the mark, so that Salop and
Romaine’s position rests not on the simple fact of increasing market share
but on the magnitude of the change. Certainly, there has been a significant increase in the use of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.61 Though its
early generations of browser did not attract users in substantial numbers,
use of Internet Explorer increased substantially after Microsoft introduced
its third and fourth generations of Internet Explorer. The trade press
credited these versions as vast improvements over Microsoft’s earlier
browsing technology, and consumers agreed, increasing Microsoft’s use for
browsing rapidly.62 But significant market success cannot be the test.
Beyond its implausibility as an interpretation of antitrust law, such a
standard would have extremely little overlap with public interest—it
would, for example, give no place to differences between competing
products, to product improvements, or to other sources of success in
competitive markets.63
A second answer could be that Salop and Romaine have misspecified
the relevant market. In the on-going litigation with DOJ, Microsoft argues
60

That is true regardless of the identity of the competitor(s) losing share to the new
entrant, despite Salop and Romaine’s focus on the fortunes of Netscape’s browser. See
Salop & Romaine, at 636-42. In the case of Internet Explorer, moreover, survey data
suggest that its gain in relative share of browser use primarily came through success against
competitors other than Netscape, and especially from consumers using Internet Explorer in
preference to AOL’s Booklink Web browser. Indeed, Dean Schmalensee’s review of the
survey data concluded that roughly 85-90 percent of the relative increase in Internet
Explorer’s use between the fall of 1996 and early 1998 resulted from consumers choosing
Internet Explorer over those other browsers and less than 15 percent from a relative decline
in use of Netscape. See Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 289-90.
61
That much is not disputed, though the sides in the DOJ-Microsoft case debate how
much of the increase for Internet Explorer came at Netscape’s expense. See note 60, supra.
62
See STANLEY J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN MARGOLIES, TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION &
COMPETITION: FROM BETA TO MICROSOFT ch. 8 (Independent Inst. 1999) (forthcoming).
63
Many of these factors, however, also are targeted by Salop and Romaine as possible
antitrust violations. Product improvement, such as through improved integration of desirable
features, can be exclusionary conduct under the Salop-Romaine analysis. Although they
would offset consumer benefits from such conduct (at least some consumer benefits), they
are unwilling to exempt from antitrust penalties conduct that enhances consumer enjoyment
of a product, improves its operation, or creates other forms of efficiency. See Salop &
Romaine, at 643-45.
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that the relevant arena for understanding these activities is the competition
among platforms that contain APIs for which other software will be
written, whether those platforms are operating systems or Web browsers or
other software embodying a particular set of programming standards.64
Applications software (like word processors, spreadsheets, games, and so
forth) typically is written for a specific software platform. A software
platform exposes APIs that other software products can call upon to obtain
services (to “turn on” particular functions that are contained in or
controlled by other software). An operating system is usually a platform,
but other products (for example, Netscape’s Web browser and JVM) can
also act as a platform. A focus on platforms plainly would encompass
Microsoft’s competition with Netscape and with Sun Microsystems.65 If
the arena in which competition is occurring is the market for platforms
rather than for a particular type of software, then Microsoft, not Netscape,
was the heavyweight when they began competing for customers.
Salop and Romaine, however, along with DOJ’s experts in its litigation
with Microsoft, resist this market definition. Doubtless, that definition
would make it quite difficult to cast Microsoft as a monopolist rather than
a competitor, as there are many, significant actual or potential competitors
in the platform market. That, of course, is its appeal to Microsoft.
Whether that is in fact the correct market definition is beside the present
point. Our observation simply is that acceptance of the platform market
definition offers one possible source of coherence to the choice Salop and
Romaine have made to cast Microsoft as the predator and Netscape as the
prey, not the other way around.
A third possible solution to the problem with Salop and Romaine’s
analysis looks to the intent of the parties. This approach is forcefully
pressed by the chief economic expert in the government’s case against
Microsoft, who makes corporate purpose the touchstone of his argument.66

64

Dean Schmalensee has taken the position, earlier advanced by Professor Fisher, that
market definition is as apt to be misleading as instructive in many cases. See United States
v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State of New York ex rel.
Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D. D.C.), crossexamination testimony of Richard L. Schmalensee, Jan. 13, 1999, p.m. sess., trans. at 25-26.
For that reason, he has spoken of a “competitive arena” rather than a “market” for platforms.
We do not believe that there is any important difference in this terminology and will use
the terms interchangeably.
65
See discussion supra note 30.
66
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State
of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233
(D. D.C.), cross-examination testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, Jun. 3, 1999, a.m. sess., trans.

[DRAFT]

ECONOMICS, LEGAL STANDARDS & MICROSOFT

19

Professor Frank Fisher asserts that one can look at what company officials
say in context with the structure of the market in which they operate and
figure out whether particular actions are motivated simply by a desire to
compete or by an interest in undermining competition.67
Perhaps, as Professor Fisher suggests, it is easier to divine an anticompetitive purpose than it is to discern which possibly anti-competitive
effects truly are inimical to competition. We should not, however, jump
to that conclusion. Group purpose is notoriously difficult to construct
under the best of circumstances, given the array of different maximands
that motivate individuals.68 And the materials from which a corporation’s
“intent” can be ascertained are particularly difficult to parse. Various
individual employees and officers routinely will discuss matters of importance to their personal vision for the firm with an eye to a particular goal
and a particular audience. Even statements from a firm’s CEO often are
unreliable indicia of an overall corporate intent. That is why, prior to his
involvement in the Microsoft case, Frank Fisher was so adamantly opposed
to placing any weight on evidence of intent:
The subjective intent of a company is difficult to
determine and will usually reflect nothing more than a
determination to win all possible business from rivals—a
determination consistent with competition … To premise
their legality on an inquiry into the specific motivations
of subjective intent of the firms that engage in such
conduct (when it is clear that all firms engaged in
competition attempt and intend to win as much business
as they can) or on retrospective evaluation of whether
there were more “desirable” alternative actions that could
have been chosen, would be to elevate competitors above
competition and threaten the entire competitive process

at 33-34 [hereinafter, Fisher Cross].
67
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State
of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233
(D. D.C.), testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, Jan. 5, 1999, ¶¶ 124-26 [hereinafter, Fisher
Direct].
68
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUE (rev. ed., John
Wiley 1963); ALLAN FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 186-94
(Nijhoff 1980); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1982); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Kenneth Shepsle, Congress is a They, Not an It: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1991).
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for the sake of those who are not intended to be its
beneficiaries and at the expense of those who are.69

We believe that Professor Fisher was right then, not now.
Salop and Romaine do not make a similar error to the Professor Fisher
of today. They would allow some scope for corporate intent, saying that it
“throws light on the likely effect of the conduct” being examined.70 That
observation, however, comes only as a footnote to their declaration that “a
strong case can be made . . . that antitrust should dispense with the
separate intent requirement and focus solely on the effects of the alleged
anticompetitive conduct.”71
As explained below, in practice there is no separate intent requirement
for corporations. The law has tended to look to firms’ actions and take as
a given that actions with a credible efficiency explanation are sufficiently
within the ordinary course of business activity no matter what employees
of the firm thought or said.72 We think this a wise course, but it does not,
then, provide an escape from the dilemma presented by the Salop-Romaine
approach.
The road that Salop and Romaine lay out could be a perilous one for
any number of businesses to travel. It places a premium on knowing how
to tell the monopolists from the competitors, but it provides no ready
mechanism for figuring out ex ante where the dividing line lies. After
looking at the various alternatives, we can find no analytical structure in
Salop and Romaine that answers the question. Perhaps only the thermos
knows.
Economic Analysis: Another View
We should be clear that our quarrel is not, by and large, with the
substance of Salop and Romaine’s speculations about what effects might
flow from particular conduct. They rightly observe that in markets with
significant network effects, a variety of actions might construct
impediments to successful competition by rivals to the firm with the
largest market share. Salop and Romaine also, in the main, identify
plausible effects of each type of action asserted in complaints against
Microsoft. As observed earlier, much of the recent writing in economics
has provided insight into the ways in which activity that could be seen as
69
70
71
72

See FISHER, MCGOWAN & GREENWOOD, supra note 1, at 272.
Salop & Romaine, at 660 n.121.
Salop & Romaine, at 660.
See discussion infra, text at notes 135-144.
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ordinary competitive conduct also plausibly could impede rivals’ competition with a dominant firm.73
The problem comes in trying to apply that insight. If the analysis stops
at the academic exercise of observing the potential impact on rivals, it is
interesting but essentially disconnected from important applications. If,
however, the analysis becomes the predicate for imposing substantial
penalties, it is problematic. To be useful to decision-makers, economic
analysis must do more than establish possibilities. It must establish at
least to some order of magnitude the probability that activity that could be
either standard competitive conduct or conduct that utterly subverts market
competition falls on one or the other side of that line. This is the
minimum goal for economic analysis of antitrust issues—issues that
ultimately are resolved in court where proof, not speculation, is required.
As is typical of writings in the nip-and-tuck school, Professor Salop and
Dr. Romaine have not met this goal.
Consider, for example, their discussion of predatory threats. An
impressive array of articles in the top academic journals over more than
two decades discuss predation and predatory threats.74 Many well-known
law-and-economics scholars have ventured onto this terrain. Salop and
Romaine draw on some of the more sophisticated entries in that literature,
but their analysis gives the reader only coulds and maybes and mights:
[P]redatory threats might be credible, even though
following through on the threats would inflict a cost on
the monopolist. . . . [I]f carrying out the threatened
conduct drives the rival to exit the market, the
monopolist could recoup by preserving its monopoly
profits. Second, it may be profitable for the monopolist
to gain a reputation as a predator. That reputation may

73

See authorities cited at note 18, supra.
See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 17; Joseph F. Brodley & George Hay,
Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981); Avinash Dixit, Entry and Exit Decisions Under
Uncertainty, 97 J. POL. ECON. 620, 620-38 (1989); Easterbrook, supra note 17; Paul Joskow
& Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213
(1979);. McGee, supra note 17; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and
Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit
Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50
ECONOMETRICA 443 (1982); Janusz Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization,
and Antitrust, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION vol. 1, at 537-96 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., North-Holland 1989); Garth Saloner, Predation,
Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165 (1987).
74
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lead future victims to fear the monopolist’s threats.
Third, the monopolist sometimes may be able to make a
binding commitment to carry out a threat that otherwise
would not be credible.75

That all translates into a speculation that if a monopolist can drive all its
rivals from the market and can keep them and others from the market over
the long term, there is a possibility that the monopolist could make enough
money to recover what was lost during a period of predatory pricing; and
if that is true, the monopolist may get its rivals’ attention with a mere
threat. But when are we apt to find a monopolist who can do that?
Salop and Romaine come closer to completing the analysts’ task when
discussing Microsoft directly. They opine that, as Microsoft has “far
‘deeper pockets’ than [most of its potential competitors, it] can outlast
[them] in a war of attrition and so a threat to continue to do so is
credible.”76 Establishing a credible predatory threat is an essential step for
their analysis, and they recognize one factor that enhances credibility.
Regrettably, they do not pursue this analysis. The capacity to outlast a
rival is only one requisite of a credible story of predation or of a credible
predatory threat. The essential question is why it is in a firm’s interest to
commit the predatory act. In a nuclear arms “game,” my having more
missiles than you bolsters your conviction that I could win if we go to
war; but what evidence is there that war makes sense for me even if I can
win? The doctrine of mutually assured destruction, which dominated
thinking about such matters for many years, was predicated on the theory
that no one would care about “winning” a nuclear war if the devastation
visited on both combatants—”winner” as well as loser—was sufficiently
high.77 Predatory pricing potentially encounters the same problem.
Salop and Romaine nod in this general direction, but they do not then
explain their contrary conclusion, that Microsoft is a plausible predatory
pricer. They recognize that a firm with a large volume of business (which
is apt to include any business with a large market share) has a lot to lose
in a war of attrition, and the market leader typically stands to lose a great

75

Salop & Romaine, at 641 [emphasis added].
Salop & Romaine, at 642.
77
See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 119-61, 230-54
(Harvard Univ. Press 1960). Our point here is not that mutually assured destruction was
the best strategy, only that it raises a critical analytical issue.
76
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deal more than most rivals.78 The utility of a predatory threat depends on
the firm’s ability to maintain a closed market long enough after ousting its
rivals to recoup the losses incurred during the predatory activity.79 Salop
and Romaine do not produce substantial basis for belief that Microsoft
could drive rivals away and then keep competitors out long enough and
raise prices high enough to make up for the losses. Salop and Romaine
provide no calculations of the sort of losses that would be likely, of the
elasticity of demand for Microsoft’s products (indeed, they do not specify
which Microsoft product they have in mind), or of other factors necessary
to resolve this issue.
The DOJ, on the other hand, if it is to succeed in its litigation against
Microsoft, must provide just the sort of information missing from Salop
and Romaine’s article. One might view the article and the DOJ evidence
as theory and practice in this area. It is not a practice that should make
the theorists comfortable. Indeed, the practice looks just as theoretical and
perhaps even more open-ended than the theory propounded in the SalopRomaine article.
The testimony, presented primarily by the government’s chief economic
expert witness, Frank Fisher, states that Microsoft has engaged in predation
by integrating its browser with Windows, a move Professor Fisher
concludes cost Microsoft millions of dollars.80 Fisher asserts that Microsoft could have sold the browser for a substantial amount of money and its
failure to do that can only be explained as a conscious decision to hurt
itself in order to inflict greater harm on its potential competitors.81 Having
adopted the DOJ market definition—Intel-compatible-PC operating
systems—Professor Fisher identifies browsers as complements to the
product that the DOJ’s case concerns.82 Microsoft’s alleged predation in
78

Salop & Romaine, at 641. See also Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note

17.
79

In noting as a possible explanation for predatory pricing the predator’s interest in
gaining a reputation as a predator, Salop and Romaine might intend to offer an explanation
divorced from the predator’s expectation of recoupment. Although the concept is
controversial, Judge Posner has explained why a strategy of predation without recoupment
is plausible in peculiar circumstances. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 185-86. The
Microsoft example, however, does not come close to the circumstances Judge Posner
describes. Microsoft competes in markets that are not nearly so closed to competition as
would be necessary to make a plausible case for predation for reputation’s sake alone.
80
Fisher Direct, supra note 67, at ¶ 122.
81
Id. at ¶¶ 123-24.
82
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State
of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233
(D. D.C.), redirect testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, Jan. 12, 1999, a.m. sess., trans. at 38
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browsers is problematic in that view because it sustains a monopoly in
operating systems.
Making Web browsers a product market separate from operating systems
is critical to the predation claim, but recognizing them as complements
creates difficulties. The importance of separating the products should be
obvious: it allows a simple focus on the price charged for browsers.
Given that Microsoft makes Internet Explorer available in some venues at
virtually a zero price, the pricing-below-cost aspect of predation becomes
far easier to establish. Yet, observing that browsers are complements to
operating systems complicates the Government’s argument.
If the
operating system and Web browsing technology are complements,
providing such technology at a very low or even a zero price could very
well be highly remunerative.83
That is exactly what Microsoft’s economic expert, Dean Richard
Schmalensee, says has occurred. Dean Schmalensee explains that Internet
Explorer’s contribution to the utility of Windows increases both the price
that consumers will pay for Windows and the volume of sales. Slight
increases in either—increases in the one to three percent range—more than
pay for Microsoft’s investment in Internet Explorer.84
Integration of
Internet Explorer into Windows to offer additional, attractive functions
follows the same approach as Microsoft’s integration of numerous other
software technologies into Windows, making it more evident that the
strategy Microsoft follows is a remunerative and not a predatory strategy.85
Simply put, the firm makes money not by selling every possible standalone product separately but by integrating the most attractive

[hereinafter, Fisher Redirect].
83
This could be true even if the browser were distributed at a “negative” price. See
note 31, supra.
84
Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 556, 563; United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al.
v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D. D.C.), direct examination testimony of
Richard L. Schmalensee, Jun. 21, 1999, p.m. sess., trans. at 56-60, & Defense Exhibit 2763.
85

Schmalensee Direct, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 577-62. Microsoft’s construction of
Internet Explorer as part of its operating system is consistent not only with past behavior
by Microsoft but also with industry norms. Nearly all (perhaps all) commercially available
desktop operating systems incorporate browsing functions, including Apple’s MacOS, IBM’s
OS/2, Sun’s Solaris, Be’s BeOS, and the Caldera and Red Hat versions of the Linux
operating system. At least one firm, IBM, integrated browsing functions with its operating
system prior to Microsoft’s release of Windows 95. See id. at Table 5. And all of these
firms integrated browsing functions without separate charges.
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complementary features into the operating system and encouraging
consumers to become familiar with those features.
Professor Fisher agrees that Microsoft is making money on the sale of
Windows and that the revenue from Windows more than pays for its costs
of developing technologies incorporated in each new version. Given his
recognition that Internet Explorer and Windows are at least complements,
even if he would define them as separate products, this would seem to end
the predation claim.
But Professor Fisher offers a new twist to the predation argument. He
declares that, even if it covers all of its Internet Explorer-related costs,
Microsoft is making less money than it might have made had it priced and
marketed Internet Explorer differently.86
Although Fisher casts this as a calculation of “below opportunity-cost
pricing” which he says is what the usual below-cost-pricing calculation
really means,87 this is a novel approach to predation. The standard
approach asks whether pricing is below a firm’s marginal costs.88 That
leaves open questions respecting the appropriate measures of cost and the
apposite time frames for computing below-cost pricing, matters of
importance in lines of business that have substantial economies of scale
and that are not yet mature products.89 Professor Fisher’s test, however,
asks instead what the theoretical profit-maximizing price is for a given
product and commands that the firm must charge that price in order not to
engage in predation. This test requires a very different set of inquiries
and implies far greater knowledge by the decision-maker—wi th respect to
matters such as the nature of the demand curve faced by the individual

86
United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State of
New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.
D.C.), direct examination testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, Jun. 1, 1999, a..m. sess., trans.
at 70.
87
Id. at 38-39.
88
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 14, at 189 (pricing below short-run marginal cost is
predatory; pricing below long-run marginal cost is predatory only if coupled with
anticompetitive intent); Areeda & Turner, supra note 17.
89
In the case of an industry in which there are substantial scale economies, short-run
marginal cost is greater than long-run marginal cost for levels of output below the long-run
minimum-cost scale. A firm that takes a long term view has an incentive in this setting to
set its price below short-run marginal cost. With respect to “immature” products or
industries, predatory pricing doctrine has recognized the difficulties in this area by creating
exceptions for firms that use promotional discounts in order to establish themselves in a
competitive market. See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d
1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989) (on promotional discounts, citing Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc.
v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48 (2d. Cir. 1979).

26

PRESERVING COMPETITION

[DRAFT]

firm—than the standard legal test.90 It is a test that leaves virtually every
business open to charges of predatory pricing, as no one will be able with
reasonable certainty to anticipate ex post calculations of the best price for
each product.91
Far from providing the sort of detailed calculations missing from Salop
and Romaine—of factors necessary to decide whether Microsoft reasonably
could be expected to engage in predation given the losses it would incur
and its prospects for preventing competitive entry—Fisher’s approach
elides any precise calculation at all.92 To circumscribe the set of
candidates for predatory pricing claims, Fisher relies once again on his
assessment of Microsoft’s intent together with an assumption that defeating
competition is especially valuable—and, hence, illicit efforts to that end
are especially likely—in a market with strong network effects.93 We have
already discussed the problem with reliance on intent in this context.94
And the network effects argument brings back to the initial question of
DOJ’s market definition, as the market with strong network effects must
be the platform market. Using that market definition makes the predatory
pricing claim difficult, as explained earlier. Moreover, invocation of
network effects does little to buttress the contention that a firm has
engaged (or is likely to) in predatory behavior. As we explain later, we
certainly find vigorous competition in the platform market plausible, but
that in no way establishes that the competition is different than in other

90

Professor Fisher himself had difficulty answering questions that are critical to this
inquiry, and he declined to offer an opinion on a key variable in making this calculation
(price elasticity of demand). Notably, the colloquy on this issue occurred in a context that
should make the calculation much more straightforward than typically would be the case,
as Fisher was asked only to find the theoretical short-run profit-maximizing price for
Windows on the assumption that Microsoft enjoyed a monopoly in the market defined by
the Government. See Fisher Cross, supra note 66, at 40-42. For this purpose, a monopolist
can be assumed to face the industry demand curve, avoiding a need for firm-specific demand
information.
91
Indeed, several empirical studies of pricing find that managers typically use costbased rules of thumb largely as a way of coping with uncertainties in the estimation of
demand, see FREDERICK M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 262 (Houghton-Mifflin Co., 3d ed. 1990) (reviewing empirical
studies of price setting). Presumably firms use rules of thumb because it is too costly to
obtain accurate estimates of the demand functions for their products before setting price.
92
See Fisher Cross, supra note 66, at 13. See also Joseph Nocera, The Big Blue
Diaries, FORTUNE, Jul. 5, 1999, at 132, 134 (“[Professor Fisher’s] testimony is almost
entirely lacking in hard figures”).
93
Fisher Redirect, supra note 82, at 21-22.
94
See discussion supra text at notes 66-72.
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markets—it is not necessarily more or less vigorous or more or less licit
than competition in other markets.95
In the end, DOJ and Professor Fisher have failed to reduce concern that
the Salop and Romaine approach is merely an open door to claims of anticompetitive conduct. They have not provided credible evidence that
Microsoft has engaged in predatory pricing much less that market
conditions are consistent with a reasonable expectation that Microsoft will
recoup its current losses with future earnings.96 Rather, the DOJ and
Fisher see evidence of intent and presence of network externalities as
persuasive that the facts of the case must fit a pattern of illicit behavior.
That approach replaces hard analysis of actual and probable effects with
surmise based on fragmentary evidence and assumption. And the problems
created by this approach become more pronounced if such analysis is
combined with the legal standard proposed by Salop and Romaine. We
turn to consideration of their suggested legal standard next.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Salop and Romaine on the Legal Standard under Section 2
Salop and Romaine tell readers that the legal standard used to judge
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act is a well settled balancing test
that weighs the harm to consumer welfare of anti-competitive conduct
against the benefits to consumer welfare (for example, from efficiency
gains).97 Their crisp discussion of this standard contrasts sharply with
their exploration of the monopolization standard under Section 2. They
title the section on the monopolization test “Section 2's Unsettled Standard,”98 and their discussion reinforces the sense that title conveys.

95

See text infra at notes 145-154.
The argument in fact is not that Microsoft will recoup losses on Internet Explorer
through higher future charges, but that losses on Internet Explorer allow Microsoft to
continue to charge a monopoly price for Windows today. United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al.
v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D. D.C.), cross examination testimony of
Franklin M. Fisher, Jan. 7, 1999, a.m. sess., trans. at 13-15, direct examination testimony
of Franklin M. Fisher, Jun. 2, 1999, a..m. sess., trans. at 27. We know of no case that
adopts such a quasi-predation, quasi-tying approach to predatory pricing. Indeed, the
concept of “recoupment” is an odd fit with other testimony of Professor Fisher about the
price at which Microsoft sells its Windows operating system. See Fisher Cross, supra note
66, at 30-43, 53-54.
97
Salop & Romaine, at 647-48.
98
Salop & Romaine, at 649.
96
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Actually, the problem is not strictly identifying the abstract standard.
The recognized test for Section 2 cases is the Grinnell test, which requires
possession of monopoly power and “willful acquisition of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior
product, business acumen or historic accident”.99 Salop and Romaine
accept that as the governing test, but they indicate that the meaning of this
test is uncertain. The reason, they suggest, is the ambiguity of the willful
acquisition component of Grinnell.
Salop and Romaine identify three “views” of the willful acquisition
prong of Grinnell: the avoidable exclusionary conduct test, the sole
purpose and effect test, and the unnecessarily restrictive conduct test.100
They argue that two views—we will refer to them as alternative tests—are
defective, while the third is not.
As Salop and Romaine cast these tests, the avoidable exclusionary
conduct test holds the monopolist liable whenever he creates barriers to
competition (that the monopolist “has the ability to forego”), whether or
not there are efficiencies associated with the monopolist’s conduct.101 The
sole purpose test holds the monopolist liable only when the creation of
competition barriers is apparently the sole purpose of his conduct. One
version of this is a “but for” test, which asks whether the monopolist’s
conduct would have been unprofitable in the absence of competition
barriers imposed by the monopolist.102 The unnecessarily restrictive
conduct test holds the monopolist liable when the exclusionary effects of
his conduct outweigh the associated consumer benefits.
Salop and Romaine state that all three of these tests have been applied
by courts at various times. The avoidable conduct test was first articulated
and applied by Judge Learned Hand in the celebrated Alcoa decision.103
The primary purpose test was applied, according to Salop and Romaine, in
the Supreme Court’s Aspen Ski decision.104 Salop and Romaine note that
the sole purpose test, rejected by Judge Hand in Alcoa, “has been used by
99

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
Salop & Romaine, at 649.
101
Salop & Romaine, at 649-50.
102
Salop & Romaine, at 650. Salop and Romaine credit Professors Ordover and
Willig for this test. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Access Bundling in HighTechnology Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY:
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds.,
Kluwer 1999).
103
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
104
Salop & Romaine, at 650 [referring to Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)].
100
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some courts.”105 The one example they provide of an application of the
sole purpose test is the recent United States v. Microsoft decision in the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,106 a decision they
plainly wish to distance from the test to be used in the current litigation.
Having found all three tests within the legal landscape, Salop and
Romaine concentrate on a normative discussion of the appropriate legal
standard. After all, the “unsettled” state of the law fairly cries out for a
normative answer; one can imagine judges pleading for someone to tell
them which of the three tests is best.
Salop and Romaine’s normative position is based on a straightforward
“error-cost” argument. The avoidable exclusionary conduct test of Judge
Hand is inappropriate, they argue, because it generates a high rate of
“false convictions”, i.e., convictions in cases where the defendant’s
conduct led to a net increase in consumer welfare. The sole purpose test
is inappropriate in their view because it generates a high rate of false
acquittals—i.e., acquittals in cases where the defendant’s conduct on net
reduced consumer welfare. The unnecessarily restrictive conduct test is
best in their view because it is capable of being applied in a manner that
minimizes the total cost of error by trading off increases in one type of
error for declines in the other type. In other words, Salop and Romaine’s
normative goal is maximizing consumer welfare, and they view the Goldilocks (“just right”) solution to be a test that, like the Section 1 test,
essentially balances expected consumer harm against expected consumer
benefit.107

105

Salop & Romaine, at 650.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
107
As a concrete example of the type of case for which the unnecessarily restrictive
conduct test is appropriate, Salop and Romaine offer the following hypothetical. “[S]uppose
the efficiency benefit involves improved performance of the product. Suppose that it were
known that the improved product performance has a value to users of $5. To make the
example extreme in order to illustrate the differences among alternative antitrust approaches,
suppose further that the higher barriers to competition [resulting from the product
improvement] were known to allow the monopolist to charge and additional $50.” Salop &
Romaine, at 646. This example immediately raises questions that Salop and Romaine never
address. For example, if a firm improves its product in a way that adds $5 to consumer
benefits, and then raises the product price by $50, why wouldn’t consumers simply stay with
the old version of the product, given that the old version gives them a greater consumer
surplus (specifically $45 more surplus)? Is it reasonable to assume that consumers are so
closely tied to the dominant firm’s product that they will switch to the new version under
these conditions? If the dominant firm behaves in this manner, why wouldn’t a competitor
offer a substitute product that gives consumers more surplus?
106
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What’s Wrong with the Salop and Romaine View
We think Salop and Romaine’s positive claim regarding the standard under
Section 2 is incorrect in most important respects, and their normative claim
is simply misguided. Salop and Romaine’s positive analysis of the Section
2 legal standard presents the law as a quite a bit more ambiguous and upfor-grabs than it really is.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted long ago, the law for most purposes
is a prediction of what a court is likely to do.108 The lawyer’s craft is
making that prediction accurately. That applies to antitrust, as to other
areas of the law: antitrust lawyers and scholars sift through the legal
authorities (which in antitrust overwhelmingly consist of case law) in order
to predict how antitrust courts will treat a certain claim.
Salop and Romaine’s analysis, however, does not attempt to provide a
prediction of how courts today, and especially the courts that will address
the Microsoft litigation, will apply the current legal standard. Salop and
Romaine instead divide the authorities into three disparate tests, but they
do not tell us which one is most likely to be applied by a court in a
monopolization case. For positive analysis, that is the question that
counts.
Positive Analysis of the Legal Standard
It also is a question that most antitrust lawyers could answer, for the field
is not so muddled as Salop and Romaine suggest. Of the three tests
defined by Salop and Romaine, the sole purpose test (or the “but for”
version of it) is the best description of the current legal standard under
Section 2. The most important line of recent Supreme Court and appellate
decisions articulating the standard under Section 2 is composed of
predatory pricing cases. Among those cases are the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Matsushita109 and Brooke Group,110 the First Circuit’s decision
in Barry Wright,111 and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rose-Acre
Farms.112 These decisions have in common a clearly-expressed view that
the costs of false convictions are especially worrisome. The recoupment
test set forth in Matsushita and further developed in Brooke Group is
properly viewed as the version of the sole purpose test Salop and Romaine

108

See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461

(1897).
109
110
111
112

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
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were most at pains to dismiss. The recoupment test asks whether the
defendant’s price-cutting would have been unprofitable in the absence of
barriers to competition. This is essentially the “but for” test that Salop
and Romaine identify as a special case of the sole purpose inquiry.113
Although Salop and Romaine cite Aspen Ski as an application of their
preferred unnecessarily-restrictive standard, this is a poor example in two
respects. First, as a predictor of the tests that will be used in the future,
Aspen Ski is a poor choice because it has not enjoyed widespread acceptance as a good decision. Indeed, it has been roundly criticized, and
appellate courts have treated the Aspen Ski doctrine as limited to the facts
of that case.114
Second, and more important, the Aspen Ski case is weak evidence even
for the modest proposition that antitrust courts have applied the
unnecessarily restrictive test to any case. The defendant in Aspen Ski
failed to provide a credible consumer-benefit or efficiency justification for
its decision to withdraw from a joint-marketing arrangement with its
weaker competitor. The Supreme Court upheld the jury’s determination in
Aspen Ski largely because the defendant failed to introduce any evidence
to counter the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s motivations were
purely anti-competitive. That is, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of
a Section 2 violation in Aspen Ski not because it thought that the
defendant’s efficiency justifications were outweighed by anti-competitive
harms, as Salop and Romaine would have us believe, but because the
defendant failed to set forth any efficiency justification whatsoever.
Even if that hurdle is passed—if someone can find a case in which a
court legitimately can be said to have adopted the unnecessarily restrictive
test—this test has not been applied in Section 2 cases with sufficient
frequency to be treated as an accepted legal doctrine. Antitrust courts
holding defendants liable for anti-competitive exclusion generally have not
reached this result through balancing pro-competitive benefits against anticompetitive harms. They have reached this result when, and pretty much
only when, the defendant has failed to provide a credible efficiency
justification.

113

Salop & Romaine, at 650.
See, e.g., Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797
F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) (“If [Aspen Ski] stands for any principle that goes beyond its
unusual facts, it is that a monopolist may be guilty of monopolization if it refuses to
cooperate with a competitor in circumstances where some cooperation is indispensable to
effective competition.”).
114
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The much-discussed case of Lorain Journal Co. v. United States115 is
exemplary. The Lorain Journal newspaper had enjoyed a local monopoly
in advertising and news dissemination. When a local radio station was
licensed to begin broadcast operations and started signing up advertisers,
the Journal refused to deal with firms that bought advertising time on the
radio station. It presented advertisers a stark choice: him or me. The
Court found a violation of Section 2 for attempted monopolization. The
Court rejected the Lorain Journal’s argument that it had a right to deal
with whomever it wished, and gave no credit to the defendant’s
justification that it was acting according to a larger implicit agreement to
protect local businesses from competing firms located outside of Lorain.
In the absence of any credible consumer-welfare justification, the Court
inferred that the Lorain Journal had a specific intent to regain its
monopoly in advertising. As in Aspen Ski, the Supreme Court upheld a
lower court finding of monopolistic exclusion not because it thought that
the anti-competitive harms outweighed the proffered consumer benefits, but
because the defendant failed to provide any credible consumer-benefit
justification.
Of the three tests identified by Salop and Romaine—avoidable
exclusion, sole purpose, and unnecessarily restrictive—only two have been
applied by antitrust courts under Section 2, the avoidable exclusion and the
sole purpose tests. Salop and Romaine correctly cite Alcoa as the key
application of the avoidable exclusion test. However, the avoidable
exclusion test has been rejected by modern antitrust courts. For example,
in United States v. Syufy Enterprises,116 Judge Kozinski had this to say
about the Alcoa doctrine:
The government trots out a shopworn argument we had
thought long abandoned: that efficient, aggressive
competition is itself a structural barrier to entry ... [T]he
wisdom of this notion has been questioned by just about
everyone who has taken a close look at it. The antitrust
laws protect competition, not competitors.117

115
116
117

Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 667.
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This is a stronger and blunter statement of the point than typical, but its
substantive content is nonetheless within the mainstream of antitrust law.118
Admittedly, American law provides ample anecdotes of courts heading
in unexpected directions, and an unusually lucky antitrust plaintiff might
find a judge who is willing to apply Salop and Romaine’s unnecessarily
restrictive test. But no one should bet his own money on that result
—especially not when a defendant has substantial efficiency justifications
on his side.
The present state of US antitrust law is fairly clear: only one test is
generally applied under Section 2, and that is the sole purpose test. Salop
and Romaine are simply wrong in suggesting that the legal standard under
Section 2 is a lottery involving three potential tests, each equally likely to
be chosen by a court. They should receive high marks for creativity in
their discussion of the legal standard, but lawyers, law students, and bar
applicants would be well advised to identify the sole purpose test as the
standard actually applied to monopolization claims.
Normative Analysis of the Legal Standard
There are good reasons why courts have coalesced around the sole purpose
test, and these reasons take us directly into Salop and Romaine’s
normative position regarding the proper legal standard under Section 2.
Salop and Romaine claim that overall error costs are minimized by
applying the unnecessarily restrictive conduct test. Antitrust courts have
generally reached a different conclusion over the past 100 years of
118

See, e.g., Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797
F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Opinion about the offense of monopolization has undergone
an evolution. Forty years ago it was thought that even a firm with a lawful monopoly . .
. could not be allowed to defend its monopoly against would-be competitors by tactics
otherwise legitimate; it had to exercise special restraint — perhaps, indeed, had to hold its
prices high, to encourage new entry. So Alcoa was condemned as a monopolist because it
had assiduously created enough productive capacity to supply all new increments of demand
for aluminum . . . Later, as the emphasis of antitrust policy shifted from the protection of
competition as a process of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting
economic efficiency . . . it became recognized that the lawful monopolist should be free to
compete like everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an umbrella over
inefficient competitors”). See also ERNEST L. GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 130 (West Pub. Co., 4th ed. 1994) (“In general, the path
of Section 2 jurisprudence since Alcoa has led toward allowing dominant firms greater
discretion to choose and implement competitive strategies, even if specific tactics vanquish
individual rivals.”); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 300 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 1998) (“Whether
Alcoa, at least as far as the excess capacity issue is concerned, would be decided the same
way today is open to serious question.”).
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applying the Sherman Act. It would be a wonderful advertisement for
economics—and a bit amazing—if two economists, thinking about the
problem for a short time, were to discover a superior approach to deciding
cases that courts had failed to discover on their own. Of course, nothing
so amazing has happened; Salop and Romaine’s analysis of error costs
reaches the wrong conclusion. Salop and Romaine’s argument also relies
on rather speculative claims about the relative costs of false convictions
and false acquittals to get there.
Let us start with the simple, basic-principles case for generally
preferring the sole purpose test to the unnecessarily restrictive test on
error-cost grounds. The sole purpose test certainly increases the likelihood
of a false acquittal relative to the unnecessarily restrictive test. However,
the cost of a false acquittal will be small whenever entry is easy. A firm
that excludes a competitor in a market with easy entry will not be able to
enjoy the fruits of its exclusionary efforts, and consequently consumers
will not be harmed.
Salop and Romaine know that, and they emphasize instances in which
entry is difficult. But that does not make their error-cost case. Of course,
the difficulty of entry is a datum in the social cost calculation, but it is
not determinate in assessing the long-run consequences of false positives
versus false negatives in antitrust. So long as entry is feasible, even if
difficult, consumers will not suffer harm in the long run as a result of
exclusionary efforts by a dominant firm; for in the long run entry will
occur and economic profits will be driven to zero. Whether consumers
suffer harm at all and the extent of harm suffered will depend on whether
and how long the dominant firm can exclude competition from entrants.
This is all Econ-101, but the point we want to stress here is that there
is a market constraint on the cost of false acquittals. Monopoly profits
attract entrants, and entry leads to an equilibrium in which consumer
welfare is at a maximum. That is true even where entry is difficult. Even
in those instances, monopoly profits will attract entry to the point at which
expected revenues will just compensate each firm for the opportunity costs
of all types of capital employed as well as for the cost of entry.119 An
incumbent, dominant firm can prevent entry in this setting only by keeping
its price sufficiently low that no potential competitor would find it
profitable to invade its market. In that instance, consumer harm, if any,
will be at a minimum.
119
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 201 (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, rev.
ed. 1988).
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There is no such self-limiting quality to the effects of false convictions.
These are more likely if Section 2 cases were decided under the unnecessarily restrictive test than under the sole purpose test. As many
commentators and courts have noted,120 false convictions can be costly. In
particular, there are three types of cost associated with false-convictions.
First, false convictions encourage firms to avoid aggressive competition
and to engage in implicitly or explicitly collusive conduct. For example,
false convictions for predatory pricing punish firms for cutting their prices.
As the probability of a false conviction for predatory pricing increases,
firms increasingly will be advised by their lawyers to avoid price
competition. Similarly, false convictions for competitive output decisions,
such as the introduction of a new product (which, if successful, almost
invariably raises rivals’ costs), encourage firms to seek market and
information sharing arrangements with their competitors. Such sharing
arrangements can easily develop into implicit or explicit collusion.121
Second, false convictions encourage, and in effect teach, firms to seek
compensation in the courts for actions by competitors that harm them.
The higher the rate of false convictions the more pronounced this lesson.
A regime in which false convictions occur frequently generates a market
in which no firm has an incentive to compete aggressively, for fear that
any competitive act may give rise to a suit for treble damages. Further,
each firm has an incentive to enforce this norm by taking competitors to
court. The monopolization lawsuit becomes an important instrument in a
market in which false convictions occur and can be especially important to
firms that are disadvantaged by competition. These firms are apt to enjoy
a relative advantage in litigation.122
Third, false convictions encourage firms to bring monopolization claims
irrespective of their validity, which increases the frequency of frivolous or
bad-faith litigation in the courts. Frivolous litigation is costly to society
even if it has no harmful side effects. However, frivolous litigation is
likely to have harmful side effects. As the frequency of frivolous
120

See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-32 (1st Cir.

1983).
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See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
See, e.g., THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 180-181(Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shugart II eds., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1995) (discussing incentives of weak competitors to use antitrust laws). See also
William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L.
& ECON. 247 (1985). These incentive effects exist even if lobbying alone is insufficient to
secure government cooperation in the litigation. See Page, supra note 21.
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monopolization claims increases, holding fixed the rate of false
convictions, firms will find it increasingly hard to tell whether damages
have been awarded appropriately in any given case decided by a court.
But this would only increase the incentive to bring frivolous claims and to
avoid competition, as firms lose faith in the competence of courts to
distinguish good and bad claims.
Thus, even if all firms comply with a non-competition norm—an
undesirable byproduct of a false convictions regime—as long as there is a
substantial risk of a false conviction, each firm will have an incentive to
seek damages from a competitor after any event that causes a shift of
business from one firm to another. For example, if a reduction in the
ozone layer causes a shift of business from one maker of sunglasses to
another, the loser will have an incentive under a false-convictions regime
to seek treble damages from the winner, on the theory that the winner’s
output and price decisions were predatory. This may seem to be a
ludicrous example, but the lure of treble damages has brought forth novel
and ingenious legal arguments in the past, such as the claim by the
plaintiffs in Matsushita that Japanese television manufacturers had engaged
in a predatory conspiracy for roughly twenty years.123
False convictions for monopolization, thus, appear substantially more
threatening to consumer welfare than false acquittals. False acquittals
leave the market in a condition in which competition is more likely over
the long run. Although competition sometimes is brutal and can seem
unfair to competitors, it serves to maximize the welfare of consumers.
That is why promoting competition, not protecting competitors, is so
widely recognized as the goal for antitrust.124 Notwithstanding temporary
departures from the competitive equilibrium, the general trend of
competitive forces, toward greater output, variety, and lower prices remains
intact in a market with false acquittals. False convictions, on the other
hand, generate a process that seems the reverse of that observed in
competitive markets. Firms learn to avoid competition and to share the
benefits of high prices with rivals and input providers.125 Output is lower,
relative to the market with false acquittals, and prices are higher. This
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should not be surprising when the choice—as it is in monopolization cases,
in contrast to cases involving collusive behavior such as price-fixing—is
between errors favoring too much competition and errors favoring too little
competition.
This divergence in error costs is likely to be greater when the dynamic
nature of competition is taken into account. Since monopoly profits attract
entrants, there will always be competitors ready to take business away
from a dominant firm that gouges consumers with high prices and poor
products. The presence of these competitors, some already in the market
and others waiting in the wings, will continually put pressure on the
dominant firm to keep its prices low and to continually improve its
products.126 By this process, the social cost of false acquittals will be
constrained and should decline over time.
In a regime of false
convictions, however, there is no comparable market mechanism to
constrain false-conviction error costs over time. Entry would not constrain
false-conviction costs, because each entrant would be subject to an
attempted monopolization claim if it went at the market too aggressively.
Entrants would learn to behave as incumbents do, and avoid competition.
Given the asymmetry in error costs, with false convictions costing far
more than false acquittals, we think the sole purpose test, which is the one
most consistent with the general approach of antitrust courts in
monopolization cases, is superior to the unnecessarily restrictive test
proposed by Salop and Romaine. Salop and Romaine are able to reach the
opposite conclusion only because they severely discount the potential error
costs associated with false convictions.
Salop and Romaine seem to think that the cost of false convictions can
be kept to a tolerable level under their proposed test. However, they
ignore the incentive for rent-seeking litigation in a regime which fails to
minimize false convictions for monopolization. There is an important fact
of life that economists often fail to realize when they apply their tools to
antitrust: hypothetical legal rules that seem to work well in economic
models may work quite poorly in real courts. The reason for this sad fact
is that courts are staffed by judges, not economists, and lawyers are
motivated by money to exploit any legal rule to the advantage of their
clients. Thus, a rule that would work well if always applied accurately,
but would generate rent-seeking litigation if sometimes applied
inaccurately, may be unwise because the rent-seeking incentives are likely
126
See, e.g., BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIG, supra note 119, at 191-242 (discussing
general theory of equilibrium with Entry); FISHER, MCGOWAN, & GREENWOOD, supra note
1, at 24-25.
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to dominate.127 As we have suggested, this general criticism applies to the
legal standard proposed by Salop and Romaine.
We have noted that antitrust courts have generally been unwilling to
apply the unnecessarily restrictive test proposed by Salop and Romaine.
Some courts have openly defended this conservative approach on the basis
of a comparison of relative error costs.128 However, in general antitrust
courts have shown a reluctance to conduct the sort of cost-benefit
balancing that Salop and Romaine recommend because it would push
judges beyond their area of competence and require courts to take on some
of the functions of public utility regulators. For in order to determine
with some degree of accuracy whether a dominant firm had expanded its
capacity in order to preempt a rival or in order to meet projected demand,
a court would have to delve deeply into business records and market
demand projections. The Supreme Court expressed a reluctance to take on
that kind of inquiry in the earliest cases interpreting the Sherman Act,129
and since then antitrust courts have stayed away from taking on the duties
of regulatory boards.130
Of course, the issue of institutional competence is closely related to that
of error costs; they are, in a sense, two sides of the same coin. It is not
an accident that courts sometimes adopt bright-line rules instead of
complicated balancing tests with respect to certain issues. Courts adopt
bright-line rules because they are aware that the alternative balancing test
is likely to be applied so inaccurately that total error costs are minimized
by adopting a bright-line rule even though it may favor one party.131 For
example, “custom” rules, shielding the defendant from liability as long as
he has complied with the custom of his profession or industry, have often
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been adopted by courts hearing tort disputes.132 These rules prevent courts
from independently applying the negligence test (a general cost-benefit
test) when the defendant has complied with the custom. Physicians, for
example, are not held liable for malpractice when they have complied with
the customs of the medical profession.133 Courts uniformly have accepted
this standard in the common—and intuitively compelling—belief that
erroneous decisions would occur more frequently if judges or juries were
permitted to define the appropriate standard of conduct in each malpractice
case.134 With respect to the Section 2 monopolization standard, antitrust
courts have adopted the sole purpose test for the same reason.
As part of their normative argument regarding the proper standard under
Section 2, Salop and Romaine state that anti-competitive intent should not
be a consideration except so far as it explains an otherwise ambiguous
action; courts should focus primarily—perhaps exclusively—on the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct.135 They suggest that courts
might try to find actual evidence of intent to clarify the true purposes of
corporate actions with potentially anti-competitive effects.136 Our defense
of the sole purpose test suggests a reason why courts will continue to treat
intent in applying the monopolization standard in a different way than
Salop and Romaine envision. Intent, as noted above, is a vague and
typically useless concept in antitrust law.137 Every competing firm wants
to monopolize the market and drive its competitors out of business, and
given this fact it would seem that every firm is guilty of possessing an
anti-competitive intent.138
Typically judges deciding Section 2 cases find anti-competitive intent
when the defendant fails to offer any pro-consumer justification for his
conduct. This was the case in Aspen Ski and in Lorain Journal.139 In
both cases, the Supreme Court upheld lower court findings of anticompetitive intent. These opinions indicate that the defendants were not
punished merely because they sought to dominate their respective markets.
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See, E.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 166-168
(West Pub. Co., 4th ed. 1971).
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Id. at 165.
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Id. at 164.
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Salop & Romaine, at 660.
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See Salop & Romaine, at 660 n.121
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See discussion supra text at notes 66-72.
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See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1396 (7th Cir.
1989); Fisher, supra note 65.
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Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608-609; Lorain Journal Co., 342 U.S. at 154-55.
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They were punished because they could not offer a reasonable efficiency
justification; and given this failure, the proper inference is that their
actions were purely anti-competitive rather than the mixed sort involving
a combination of potential benefits to consumers and potential barriers to
competition.140
The fact that courts often refer to anti-competitive intent is not, as Salop
and Romaine suggest, an odd feature that remains largely as a result of
some useless precedent. Nor, on the other extreme, is it an indication that
judges engage in the perilous activity of divining actual intent in these
cases by looking at what corporate personnel said to each other or to
customers or to reporters. As we have said, unlike price-fixing cases or
other settings in which the statements of corporate personnel are important
for their effect on other actors, not for representing their motivations,
monopolization cases are extremely unlikely to offer meaningful
opportunity or reason to inquire into individuals’ state-of-mind.141 Salop
and Romaine are quite right in saying that “[w]hen there are multiple
motives and effects, it is impossible to talk about the purpose of the
conduct.”142 Courts could reach the right conclusions without referring to
intent, and when they use the term in monopolization cases, they are
referring more to an analytical construct in the nature of a burden of
persuasion than to an inquiry into personal motives and beliefs.143
What Salop and Romaine fail to note, however, is that the limited use
now made of the “intent” concept in Section 2 cases takes the law in a
very different direction than they would or than the DOJ would.
Reference to “intent” serves the useful purpose of constraining courts to
apply a sole purpose standard to monopolization cases. It reminds
decision-makers that only if no legitimate purpose is plausible will courts
presume conduct to be sufficiently anti-competitive as to violate Section
2’s commands.144 This approach serves as a screen that filters out
monopolization claims brought against defendants where the conduct
involves potential consumer benefits coupled with potential barriers to
competition. Courts have decided, correctly in our view, that applying
monopolization strictures is inappropriate for these types of cases.
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The “Special Case” of “Network Markets”
To this point, we have considered the general case for choosing the sole
purpose test over the unnecessarily restrictive conduct test. However, part
of Salop and Romaine’s argument includes the claim that the market for
operating software is different, largely because of the existence of network
effects. They claim that monopoly is more durable, and entry more
difficult in markets with network externalities.
Even if these observations are true, they are insufficient to justify
modifying a legal standard that has been applied reasonably well across
the board to all sorts of industries with varying entry conditions. The key
question is whether network effects prevent entry, or make entry so
difficult that it would be appropriate to treat network industries under a
legal standard that differs from that applied to all other industries. We are
aware of no evidence proving entry infeasible in markets with network
effects, or demonstrating that network industries should be judged under a
different legal standard.
Moreover, in assessing the difficulty of entry, it is not enough, in our
view, simply to mention the existence of network effects, or the chickenand-egg problem, features asserted by Salop and Romaine as reasons for
treating Microsoft differently from dominant firms in other markets.145
The existence of network effects implies only that successful entry is
difficult, not that it is impossible. Moreover, while network effects imply
that the probability of successful entry is lower than it would otherwise
be, they also imply that the payoff from successful entry is larger than it
would otherwise be. The incentive to enter is determined by the expected
payoff from entry, which is the product of the probability of successful
entry and the payoff from successful entry. Network effects theory tells
us that the probability is lower and the payoff is higher. It should be
clear that this falls far short of offering a theoretical demonstration that
entry conditions should be assumed to be radically different in network
industries. Before anyone can conclude that the incentive to enter is lower
in a network market, there are a few questions that should be answered.
Is the probability of successful entry lower in a network market than in a
comparable market without network effects? If the probability of
successful entry is lower in the network market than in comparable
markets, is the payoff from successful entry large enough to offset the
dilution of entry incentives due to the lower probability of success?
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It is a commonplace of economic analysis that as expected returns on an
investment rise, so does the magnitude of the investment made in order to
compete for the return.146 This relationship tends to drive investment in
such industries to the point at which the expected return from marginal
investment in that arena equals the return expected elsewhere.147 Why
should that not hold for investment in industries with network effects just
as much as for other investments?
While the equal-expected-payoff story is an analytically sound starting
point, there is no guarantee that the equality will hold in all cases. It is
possible, for instance, that risk aversion will skew investment decisions.
If there is a systemic tendency to under-investment in riskier propositions,
there could be a reduction in the risk-adjusted value of low probabilityhigh payoff investments. So far as we know, however, there is no robust
explanation of why thick capital markets would systematically over-weight
low-risk investments. For at least some sectors of the market, indeed,
there is a well-developed literature exposing widespread tendencies to
over-invest in risky propositions.148 These explanations primarily address
situations involving exogenous constraints on capital markets—the US
savings-and-loan debacle is a prime example.149 Agency-cost theory has
informed attempts to extend the analysis to corporate investment more
broadly, but these extensions are open to considerable question.150 At
present, the most that can be said with confidence is that the equal146
This is an implication of basic investment theory, see, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY &
STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 180-181 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed. 1984)
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expected-payoff story is plausible and has not been replaced by any strong
general theory to the contrary.
Let us, however, give Salop and Romaine the benefit of the argument
here. Assume that there is a tendency to under-invest in low probabilityhigh payoff events. If that is so, and if that describes investment in markets with large network effects, it still does not provide plain support for
intervention. Indeed, intervention in such markets is analogous to a tax on
a successful entrant.
If the reward of a high payoff already is
undervalued, the threat of an additional penalty to investments that yield
such payoffs would seem a peculiar way of encouraging additional
investment.
Salop and Romaine have a great deal to say about a related topic, the
connection between network effects and innovation incentives. Most of
what they say on this subject is inconclusive and openly speculative.
Consider, for example, their observation that one “might argue that
exclusion does not increase total innovation, but actually decreases
innovation competition, by reducing the incentives of new entrants to
attempt to compete on the basis of better products.”151
Such observations are weak analytical reeds on which to base important
policy prescriptions. Analytically, the probability-payoff framework
discussed above applies to the innovation issue as much as to other investments needed to enter a network industry. If network markets are different
in the sense that a favorable market position, once achieved, is more
durable, this merely implies that the incentive to innovate is generally
greater in network markets. The same arguments applicable to investment
across the board also apply to innovation investments.
Indeed, if there is greater durability to returns from investment because
of greater insulation from the erosion of successes in network markets
(which, we repeat, are not clearly correct assumptions in any meaningful
measure), that describes the basic structure thought to encourage
innovation. Intellectual property rights enhance the payoff from successful
innovation while raising the cost to other firms of competing with the right
holder.152 In that sense, the Salop and Romaine analysis is at odds with
the basic theory behind intellectual property rights. Such rights are
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granted to enhance both the quantity and quality of new products.153
Weakening such rights may have effects exactly opposite those suggested
by Salop and Romaine. Whether our intellectual property laws in fact
have gotten the incentive issue right—both the direction and magnitude of
effects from issuance of those rights—is debated.154 But Salop and
Romaine do not purport to be rewriting those laws. Instead, they cast
their effort as one of analyzing other consumer welfare issues. And
antitrust litigation hardly seems the right venue for altering the basic
underpinnings of copyright and related laws.
Ultimately, we cannot answer whether network markets have sufficiently
distinctive characteristics from other markets to merit different treatment
under antitrust or other laws. But when Salop and Romaine contend for
a changed antitrust standard for those markets, they have a burden of
providing more than speculation that investment may be discouraged and
innovation reduced. As with other aspects of their analysis, they have
provided a set of possibilities. These are not more likely to be true than
the obverse in each case. Such weak speculation is an unlikely and
unwise source of guidance for proposed changes in antitrust law in any
event and especially where the changes would at the same time reduce the
intellectual property protections that generally are thought to encourage
innovation.
CONCLUSION
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Mark Twain has a wonderful passage in Life on the Mississippi poking fun
at popular pseudo-science. Twain begins with the observation, gleaned
from a news story, that soil was being carried down the Mississippi River
and deposited at the delta near the mouth of the river; as the deposits built
over time, the river was becoming shorter, according to the story. From
that humble start, Twain spun a series of possible consequences, ending
with Chicago and New Orleans joining and electing a single mayor for
both. He asks where but in science can you can such wholesale returns in
conjecture for such a trivial investment in facts.155 Twain had not
encountered modern economic analysis of antitrust issues.
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MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 156 (Harper & Row 1917; originally
published 1883). We owe Glen Robinson for reminding us of this story.

